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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ZACHARY EUGENE THARP,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43908
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-5021
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zachary Tharp appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence following his guilty plea to discharging a firearm at a
dwelling. Specifically, he contends that, by imposing as long a fixed sentence as it did,
the district court foreclosed the opportunity for timely rehabilitation to occur despite the
presentence investigator’s recognition that Mr. Tharp “is young enough to make the
necessary changes should his professed intentions [to rehabilitate] be genuine.”
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.23.) A sufficient consideration of
the mitigating factors, such as his imperfect self-defense claim, shows the more lenient
sentence would better serve the goals of sentencing in this case. As such, this Court
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should either reduce Mr. Tharp’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively,
remand this case for a new sentencing decision.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Tharp was only 26 years old at the time of the instant offense. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.1.)1 He had a dysfunctional childhood, as both parents were drug
addicts. (PSI, p.503.) Mr. Tharp also had some psychiatric hospitalizations during his
childhood. (PSI, p.16.) Notably, following his father’s death, Mr. Tharp was diagnosed
with major depressive disorder, a mood disorder, complicated bereavement, and
polysubstance abuse. (PSI, p.591; see also PSI, p.104 (more recent evaluations giving
rule out diagnoses for a mood disorder not otherwise specified, generalized anxiety
disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder).) A few years later, he suffered
a closed head injury in an automobile accident.

(PSI, pp.16, 585.)

Evaluations

conducted during the PSI process in this case recommended he participate in intensive
outpatient treatment to deal with the mental health issues he continues to experience.
(PSI, pp.101, 113.)
Mr. Tharp had also been struggling to find housing after serving a prior sentence.
(PSI, p.22) Those struggles meant that he was unable to maintain the employment he
had found, which was a graveyard shift. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, L.17 - p.19, L.1.) From there,
things began spiraling out of his control. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.1-3.) He met a girlfriend

The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of
the change of plea hearing held on October 5, 2015. “Vol.2” will refer to the volume
containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on December 21, 2015.

1

2

who may not have been the best influence on him. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.4-5.) Still,
he had the desire to work on overcoming their drug addictions. (See PSI, pp.5, 7.)
However, that process was not easy, and his girlfriend made statements
indicating her suicidal ideations to overdose on heroin and oxycodone.

(PSI, p.7.)

When Mr. Tharp learned who was continuing to supply her with drugs, he and the
dealer exchanged texts, which became an argument, which escalated to a challenge to
fight. (PSI, pp.5, 7.) The district court accepted Mr. Tharp’s explanation that he was
intending only to confront the dealer, and that he had not intended to fire his gun during
that confrontation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.13-19.)
On the way to the confrontation, Mr. Tharp said his girlfriend warned him that the
dealer had guns and grenades, and he would try to kill Mr. Tharp. (PSI, p.7.) Upon
arriving at the designated place, Mr. Tharp saw the person he believed to be his
girlfriend’s dealer, and thought he saw that person draw a weapon. (PSI, p.7.) Defense
counsel pointed out that there were witness statements which corroborated Mr. Tharp’s
account that people were shooting toward him. (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-4; see PSI, pp.198-99
(police report of those statements).) Regardless, Mr. Tharp admitted that he reacted
inappropriately to that situation, as he proceeded to fire his own weapon in the direction
of the dealer, hitting several nearby residences in the process, before fleeing the scene.
(PSI, pp.7-8.)

Several charges were brought against Mr. Tharp as a result of his

actions. (R., pp.37-39.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tharp pled guilty to one count of discharging a
firearm at an occupied dwelling. (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.11-12.) Although the remaining
charges would be dismissed pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Tharp agreed to pay

3

restitution on the dismissed counts.2 (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.14-16.) The State also agreed
to limit its sentencing recommendation to a unified term of fifteen years, with seven
years fixed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.12-14.)
At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained Mr. Tharp realized
a period of probation or retained jurisdiction would not be proper in his case. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.17, Ls.6-7, 17-20.) As a result, defense counsel recommended a unified sentence of
fifteen years, but with only three years fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-7.) The difference
between her recommendation and the prosecutor’s, defense counsel argued, was that
her recommendation created motivation and an opportunity for Mr. Tharp to engage in
timely rehabilitative programming during his incarceration. (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-9.) If
Mr. Tharp committed to his programming, defense counsel explained, he would be
eligible for parole, but if he did not, he could still be required to serve the maximum term
authorized by statute. (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-8.)
For his part, Mr. Tharp expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for his
actions. (Tr., Vol.2, p.21, Ls.1-13; see also PSI, pp.7-8, 19.) He also expressed his
amenability to rehabilitation. (See, e.g., PSI, p.23.) To that point, he explained that he
had decided to denounce his prior gang lifestyle. (PSI, pp.12-13.) The PSI author
summarized his situation:
Mr. Tharp professed a strong desire to change his lifestyle, abstain from
drugs, and obtain employment skills and experience in order to sustain his
desired change. The defendant’s criminal record and past documented
behavior of chronic drug use and gang affiliation indicate Mr. Tharp has
substantial challenges to overcome; fortunately for him the defendant is
young enough to make the necessary changes should his professed
intentions be genuine.
The prosecutor subsequently indicated she would not be filing a restitution request in
this case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-18.)
2
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(PSI, p.23.)
However, the district court explained it did not have confidence that Mr. Tharp
would take advantage of programming opportunities. (Tr., Vol.2, p.25, Ls.1-3.) It noted
that he had issues while serving his prior sentence, and he had been afforded
programming before which had not been effective. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.19.)
As a result, the district court imposed and executed a unified term of fifteen years, with
seven years fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.25, Ls.16-19; R., pp.103-05.)
Mr. Tharp filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.108-09.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Tharp.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On
Mr. Tharp
In order for Mr. Tharp to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s
sentencing decision in this case, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997). The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of
society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also
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accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).

This is because the protection of society is

influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in
sentencing.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.

However, the Idaho

Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial
consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103
(2015).
In this case, the sentencing objectives would be best served by the sentence
defense counsel recommended, as it is the one that would provide not only an
opportunity, but also the motivation, for Mr. Tharp to engage in timely rehabilitative
programming. As defense counsel acknowledged, a period of probation or retained
jurisdiction would not be appropriate, but a sentence with a shorter fixed time would still
facilitate timely access to the prison programs, thus giving Mr. Tharp an opportunity to
prove his desire to change was legitimate. (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.6-7; Tr., Vol.2, p.20,
Ls.4-9.) On the other hand, defense counsel explained, the sentence the district court
ultimately imposed risked putting Mr. Tharp in a situation where he “he could just
perpetuate [the] cycle” which had concerned the district court at sentencing. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.20, Ls.8-12; Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.19.) That means the sentence ultimately
imposed provides less protection to society in the long term than the sentence
recommended by defense counsel.
To that point, Mr. Tharp is relatively young, and, as the PSI author explained, that
means the time to try rehabilitative options is now: “fortunately for him the defendant is
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young enough to make the necessary changes should his professed intentions be
genuine.” (PSI, p.23.) Therefore, the district court’s decision to foreclose that timely
opportunity to rehabilitate with an extended fixed sentence constitutes an abuse of its
discretion. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953) (recognizing the timing
of rehabilitative opportunities is an important consideration); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho
482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). This is particularly true with younger defendants like
Mr. Tharp. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 48990.
Additionally, the Legislature has indicated leniency is appropriate in cases where
“[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal
conduct, though failing to establish a defense.” I.C. § 19-2521(2)(d). The district court
accepted Mr. Tharp’s explanation that he was trying to confront the person who was
continuing to deal drugs to his girlfriend so as to get him to stop, and that Mr. Tharp had
not intended to fire his gun during that confrontation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.12-17.) It also
explained that, “even if that person that day had a firearm, of course I think you know
that you handled this completely wrong.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.18-19; see also Tr., Vol.2,
p.15, Ls.18-20 (defense counsel acknowledging that the other facts about the
confrontation did not excuse Mr. Tharp’s choices during that encounter).) The district
court’s statements in this regard show it recognized that there was an imperfect selfdefense claim in this case, and that is precisely the sort of scenario the Legislature
considered to be grounds for leniency in imposing sentence. See I.C. § 19-2521(d).
Therefore, a sufficient consideration all the facts in the record reveals the district court’s
rejection of the more lenient sentence is an abuse of discretion.
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There are several other mitigating factors in the record which further support that
conclusion.

Mr. Tharp repeatedly expressed remorse and accepted responsibility

for his actions.

(PSI, pp.7-8, 19; Tr., Vol.2, p.21, Ls.1-13.)

He was willing to

compensate the victims of his actions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.14-16.) This is only his
second adult felony, a fact which is particularly noteworthy given his prior gang
affiliation. (PSI, pp.8-10, 21-22.) The fact that he has dissociated himself from the gang
(see PSI, pp.13, 22) demonstrates his desire to change is legitimate. Similarly, the fact
that he has earned his GED (PSI, p.15) demonstrates he is capable of being successful
in such efforts. Finally, he has mental health issues which need to be addressed to help
him be more likely to succeed upon his eventual release. (See PSI, pp.101-13.)
In light of all the mitigating factors, a more lenient sentence which promotes
rehabilitative options would best serve the goals of sentencing. As such, the district
court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence with an excessive fixed term, one
which foreclosed timely opportunities to rehabilitate.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Tharp respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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